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1.  Introduction 
 
There are various hypotheses according to which exchange rate volatility may affect 
unemployment. Some papers argue that this effect depends on the characteristics of the labor 
market. Specifically, Andersen and Sørensen (1988) argue that if trade unions are strong, volatile 
exchange rates may lead to excessive wage hikes, lowering employment. Similarly, Belke and 
Kaas (2004) argue that if labor market rigidities improve workers’ bargaining position, thus 
increasing wages and lowering the net return to firms, higher exchange rate volatility is likely to 
induce firms to delay job creation. According to Belke and Gros (2001), even a temporary 
increase in exchange rate volatility can induce firms to postpone the creation of jobs since 
volatile exchange rates raise the uncertainty of future earnings and thus the ‘option value of 
waiting’ (Dixit 1989). They argue that although this concept concerns investment projects, hiring 
workers represents an investment in the sense that there are high costs to reversing this decision, 
particularly if dismissal regulation is strict. 
 
Volatile exchange rates may also increase unemployment via lower investment in physical 
capital. Investment may be reduced because higher volatility usually entails increased 
uncertainty. However, as Darby et al. (1999) argue theoretically, the effect of exchange rate 
volatility on investment may be either negative or positive, depending on specific characteristics 
of the respective industry such as scrapping prices, opportunity costs of waiting as well as input 
costs and output prices. 
 
So far there are only few empirical studies analyzing the effect of exchange rate volatility on 
unemployment. In a series of papers, Belke and coauthors study the impact of exchange rate 
volatility in the Mercosur area (Belke and Gros 2002a), in central and eastern Europe (Belke 
2005), within the EU (Belke and Gros 2001) and between Euroland and the US (Belke and Gros 
2002b). In each case they find exchange rate volatility to adversely affect unemployment. 
Focusing on the case of Germany, Stirböck and Buscher (2000) also find some evidence that 
higher volatility increases unemployment. 
 
There are also few studies on the investment effect of exchange rate volatility. For example, 
Goldberg (1993) finds that, in the United States, exchange rate volatility tended to expand 
investment in manufacturing durables industries in the 1970s, but was more likely to be 
associated with investment contractions in the 1980s. Furthermore, she finds that it tended to 
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depress investment in US non-manufacturing industries. Darby et al. (1999) find that, between 
the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, exchange rate volatility depressed investment in Germany, 
France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
This paper studies empirically the impact of exchange rate volatility on unemployment. It 
innovates in three important respects. First, it is the first to use data from all major industrial 
countries. Second, it uses a new index of exchange rate volatility. Third, in contrast to previous 
papers, it employs a large set of controls. 
 
 
2.  Data and methodology 
 
Our variable of interest uses GARCH (1, 1) volatility of real effective exchange rate monthly 
percentage change (for definitions and sources of all variables, see Table 1). As the data on our 
other variables are in annual frequency, we calculate annual averages of the monthly exchange 
rate volatility data. GARCH measures of conditional volatility are a good proxy for uncertainty 
since the latter is best defined as the variance of the stochastic, unpredictable component of a 
variable. They are also superior to unconditional measures such as the standard deviation since 
the latter ignore relevant information on the random process generating the exchange rate. 
Therefore, our measure of exchange rate volatility appears to be better suited than the ones used 
in previous papers studying the unemployment effect of exchange rate volatility, which almost 
exclusively use the standard deviation. 
 
To avoid omitted variables bias, we control for the impact of all other major factors that have 
been found to determine the unemployment rate. This is in contrast to all previous papers 
estimating the unemployment effect of exchange rate volatility, which use hardly any controls. In 
our baseline specification, we control for six major labor market institutions as well as for 
product market regulation, business cycle fluctuations, their interaction with exchange rate 
volatility and the share of trade in GDP. In our first robustness check, we use random rather than 
fixed effects to control for unobserved country-specific effects. In our second robustness check, 
we use a measure of centralization rather than coordination of wage bargaining. In our third 
check, we substitute labor and consumption tax rates for the tax wedge. In our fourth and fifth 
checks, we use disaggregated measures of employment protection legislation and unemployment 
benefits, respectively. In our sixth, seventh and eighth checks, we additionally control for active 
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labor market policies, central bank independence and macroeconomic shocks, respectively.
1
 
Each regression also controls for the impact of time trend. All explanatory variables are lagged 
by one year to lessen concerns about possible simultaneity bias and to allow for slow adjustment. 
 
Our sample includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United 
States. The sample period is 1982 to 2003.
2
 
 
 
3.  Results 
 
The coefficient on ‘exchange rate volatility’ is statistically significant in each of our regressions 
(Table 2). Higher volatility is correlated with higher unemployment in the following year. In 
most robustness checks, the size of the coefficient is very similar to the estimate from our 
baseline specification. 
 
In line with previous studies, our results suggest that the magnitude of the effect is small. 
Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the ‘exchange rate volatility’ variable is 
associated with an increase in unemployment of between 0.21 and 0.36 percentage points, ceteris 
paribus.
3
 
 
We also examine the possibility of reverse causality. Table 3 presents four regressions with the 
unemployment rate as an explanatory variable and exchange rate volatility as the dependent 
variable. While regression 1 uses the unemployment rate as the sole explanatory variable, 
regressions 2 to 4 additionally use variables that might affect the volatility of exchange rates. In 
none of these regressions do we find any evidence of causality running from the unemployment 
rate to exchange rate volatility. Thus the estimates reported in Table 2, which indicate a 
statistically significant adverse effect of exchange rate volatility on unemployment, are likely to 
be causal. 
 
                                                 
1
 Since Hall and Franzese (1998) argue that the effect of central bank independence may depend on the degree of 
wage bargaining coordination, we also employ an interaction term. 
2
 Both the number of countries and the length of the sample period are determined by data availability. 
3
 These figures are based on the smallest and the largest coefficient on ‘exchange rate volatility’ from the 
regressions presented in Table 2. 
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Finally, a brief comment on our estimates for the control variables used in our regressions to 
explain the unemployment rate (Table 2). By and large, they accord with the previous literature 
on the determinants of unemployment (for a survey, see Bassanini and Duval 2006, Annex 1). 
For example, we find that higher labor taxes, higher unemployment benefits replacement rates, 
tighter dismissal protection for workers with regular contracts, lower expenditure on active labor 
market policies, less central bank independence and stronger macroeconomic shocks are likely to 
raise unemployment. Additionally, we find a higher degree of trade openness to be associated 
with a lower unemployment rate. These results, as well as the significant estimates for the other 
controls, underline the importance of controlling for all major factors that affect the 
unemployment rate when analyzing the impact of exchange rate volatility. 
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Table 1. List of variables 
 
 Definition Source 
Active labor market 
policies 
Public expenditure on active labor market programs per unemployed worker as a decimal fraction of GDP 
per capita 
Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Average unemployment 
benefits replacement rate 
Gross unemployment benefits as a decimal fraction of previous gross wage earnings. Averages across two 
income situations (100% and 67% of average production worker earnings), three family situations (single, 
with dependent spouse, with spouse in work) and three different unemployment durations (first year, 
second and third years, fourth and fifth years of unemployment) 
Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Central bank independence The index ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values representing more independence. It assesses both the legal 
status of the central bank and its reputation for independence 
IMF (2003) 
Collective bargaining 
coverage 
Employees covered by collective wage bargaining agreements as a decimal fraction of all wage and salary 
earners in employment with the right to bargaining 
Visser (2009) 
Consumption tax rate Total amount of consumption tax paid in a country as a decimal fraction of total consumption. The 
consumption tax rate is derived from National Accounts 
Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Employment protection 
legislation 
Indicator of the stringency of employment protection legislation. Unweighted average of measures for 
regular and temporary contracts. The ratings are scaled to range from 0 (least restrictive) to 0.6 (most 
restrictive) 
Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Employment protection 
legislation regular contracts 
Indicator of the stringency of employment protection legislation for regular contracts. The ratings are 
scaled to range from 0 (least restrictive) to 0.6 (most restrictive) 
Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Employment protection 
legislation temporary 
contracts 
Indicator of the stringency of employment protection legislation for temporary contracts. The ratings are 
scaled to range from 0 (least restrictive) to 0.6 (most restrictive) 
Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Exchange rate volatility Annual average of GARCH(1,1) volatility of real effective exchange rate monthly percent change IMF (2008) 
Initial unemployment 
benefits replacement rate 
Gross unemployment benefits during the first year of unemployment as a decimal fraction of previous 
gross wage earnings. Averages across two income situations (100% and 67% of average production worker 
earnings) and three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in work) 
Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Interest rate shock Difference between 10-year nominal government bond yield (in %) and annual change in the GDP deflator 
(in %) 
Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Labor tax rate Total amount of tax paid on labor earnings in a country as a decimal fraction of total labor costs. The labor 
tax rate is derived from National Accounts 
Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Openness Ratio of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP World Bank (2009) 
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Table 1. List of variables (cont.) 
 
 Definition Source 
Output gap The gap between actual and potential output as a percentage of potential output OECD (2009) 
Product market regulation Indicator of regulatory impediments to product market competition in the following seven non-
manufacturing industries: gas, electricity, post, telecoms (mobile and fixed services), passenger air 
transport, railways (passenger and freight services) and road freight. The ratings are scaled to range from 0 
(least restrictive) to 0.6 (most restrictive) 
Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Tax wedge Sum of personal income tax plus employee’s and employer’s social security contributions less cash benefits 
as a decimal fraction of total labor cost for an employee earning the average production worker wage; 
single-earner couple with two children 
Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Terms of trade shock Logarithm of the relative price of imports weighted by the share of imports in GDP [(M/Y) log (PM/PY)] Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Total factor productivity 
shock 
Deviation of the logarithm of total factor productivity from its trend. Trend growth rate of total factor 
productivity calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ = 100) 
Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Trade union density The share of workers affiliated to a trade union; decimal fraction Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Unemployment benefits 
duration 
Unemployment benefit duration in years Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Unemployment rate Unemployed as a percentage of the civilian labor force (harmonized rates) OECD (2007) 
Wage bargaining 
centralization 
The dominant level(s) at which wage bargaining takes place. 5-point classification: 1 = national or central 
level; 0.75 = national or central level with additional sectoral, local or company bargaining; 0.5 = sectoral 
or industry level; 0.25 = sectoral or industry level with additional local or company bargaining; 0 = local or 
company bargaining 
Visser (2009) 
Wage bargaining 
coordination 
Degree of coordination of wage bargaining. 5-point classification: 1 = economy-wide bargaining, based on 
enforceable agreements between the central organizations of unions and employers affecting the entire 
economy or the entire private sector, or based on government imposition of a wage schedule, freeze or 
ceiling; 0.75 = mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining: central organizations negotiate non-
enforceable central agreements (guidelines) and/or key unions and employers associations set a pattern for 
the entire economy; 0.5 = industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting, limited involvement of 
central organizations and limited freedoms for company bargaining; 0.25 = mixed industry- and firm-level 
bargaining, with weak enforceability of industry agreements; 0 = none of the above, fragmented 
bargaining, mostly at company level 
Visser (2009) 
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Table 2. Regressions to explain the unemployment rate
a)
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Baseline 
specification 
Random 
effects 
substituted 
for fixed 
effects
b)
 
Wage bar-
gaining cen-
tralization 
substituted 
for wage 
bargaining 
coordination 
Labor & 
consumption 
tax rates 
substituted 
for tax 
wedge 
Employment 
protection 
legislation 
split into two 
components 
Average 
unemploy-
ment bene-
fits replace-
ment rate 
split into two 
components 
Active labor 
market 
policies 
added 
Central bank 
indepen-
dence added 
Macroeco-
nomic 
shocks 
added 
Exchange rate volatility 2.91*** 
(0.95) 
2.92*** 
(0.96) 
2.91*** 
(0.95) 
2.25* 
(1.11) 
2.47** 
(0.85) 
2.66*** 
(0.90) 
2.77** 
(1.02) 
2.54** 
(0.87) 
1.72* 
(0.91) 
Trade union density 4.93 
(7.90) 
-1.22 
(3.09) 
4.66 
(7.65) 
4.00 
(5.33) 
10.70 
(9.08) 
6.31 
(7.47) 
5.29 
(6.74) 
6.40 
(7.77) 
7.33 
(7.32) 
Collective bargaining 
coverage 
4.27 
(3.55) 
4.95** 
(2.31) 
4.56 
(3.55) 
3.99 
(3.57) 
4.68 
(3.26) 
4.58 
(3.58) 
4.99 
(3.30) 
4.54 
(3.60) 
5.72* 
(2.86) 
Wage bargaining coordination -0.64 
(0.55) 
-0.85 
(0.56) 
 -1.08* 
(0.51) 
-0.62 
(0.54) 
-0.83 
(0.63) 
-0.51 
(0.54) 
-1.68 
(1.24) 
-0.72 
(0.50) 
Tax wedge 18.01*** 
(4.74) 
16.37*** 
(4.69) 
18.15*** 
(4.63) 
 17.81*** 
(4.86) 
18.47*** 
(4.90) 
15.89*** 
(4.33) 
17.78*** 
(5.13) 
13.28** 
(4.57) 
Employment protection 
legislation 
-0.47 
(7.69) 
-3.79 
(5.83) 
-0.43 
(7.35) 
-0.39 
(6.48) 
 -0.09 
(7.21) 
6.46 
(7.22) 
-1.26 
(8.15) 
-1.79 
(6.66) 
Average unemployment 
benefits replacement rate 
5.37 
(3.14) 
4.01* 
(2.26) 
5.15* 
(2.87) 
0.09 
(2.83) 
5.91* 
(2.82) 
 8.10** 
(2.79) 
6.42* 
(3.10) 
1.60 
(2.93) 
Product market regulation 1.13 
(3.51) 
1.35 
(3.35) 
1.45 
(3.49) 
0.67 
(4.22) 
1.99 
(3.90) 
1.64 
(3.08) 
-2.42 
(2.98) 
0.98 
(3.90) 
-1.29 
(3.90) 
Output gap -1.09*** 
(0.30) 
-1.10*** 
(0.29) 
-1.07*** 
(0.29) 
-0.96** 
(0.33) 
-1.06*** 
(0.28) 
-1.09*** 
(0.30) 
-0.92*** 
(0.25) 
-1.09*** 
(0.28) 
-0.92*** 
(0.22) 
Exchange rate volatility * 
output gap 
0.68 
(0.40) 
0.67* 
(0.39) 
0.64 
(0.39) 
0.47 
(0.45) 
0.64 
(0.38) 
0.68 
(0.41) 
0.55 
(0.37) 
0.68* 
(0.37) 
0.44 
(0.28) 
Openness -5.61** 
(1.98) 
-5.46*** 
(1.66) 
-5.72** 
(2.04) 
-4.43** 
(2.02) 
-5.01*** 
(1.67) 
-5.29** 
(1.86) 
-5.89*** 
(1.95) 
-4.97** 
(1.96) 
-8.35*** 
(2.29) 
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Table 2. Regressions to explain the unemployment rate
a)
 (cont.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Baseline 
specification 
Random 
effects 
substituted 
for fixed 
effects
b)
 
Wage bar-
gaining cen-
tralization 
substituted 
for wage 
bargaining 
coordination 
Labor & 
consumption 
tax rates 
substituted 
for tax 
wedge 
Employment 
protection 
legislation 
split into two 
components 
Average 
unemploy-
ment bene-
fits replace-
ment rate 
split into two 
components 
Active labor 
market 
policies 
added 
Central bank 
indepen-
dence added 
Macroeco-
nomic 
shocks 
added 
Wage bargaining 
centralization 
  -0.84 
(0.56) 
      
Labor tax rate    28.97*** 
(9.40) 
     
Consumption tax rate    13.60 
(11.48) 
     
Employment protection 
legislation regular contracts 
    20.17* 
(10.72) 
    
Employment protection leg-
islation temporary contracts 
    -1.27 
(3.80) 
    
Initial unemployment benefits 
replacement rate 
     5.03*** 
(1.54) 
   
Unemployment benefits 
duration 
     0.27 
(0.84) 
   
Active labor market policies       -2.74*** 
(0.49) 
  
Central bank independence        -3.29* 
(1.72) 
 
Central bank independence * 
wage bargaining coordination 
       2.20 
(2.06) 
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Table 2. Regressions to explain the unemployment rate
a)
 (cont.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Baseline 
specification 
Random 
effects 
substituted 
for fixed 
effects
b)
 
Wage bar-
gaining cen-
tralization 
substituted 
for wage 
bargaining 
coordination 
Labor & 
consumption 
tax rates 
substituted 
for tax 
wedge 
Employment 
protection 
legislation 
split into two 
components 
Average 
unemploy-
ment bene-
fits replace-
ment rate 
split into two 
components 
Active labor 
market 
policies 
added 
Central bank 
indepen-
dence added 
Macroeco-
nomic 
shocks 
added 
Total factor productivity 
shock 
        11.77* 
(6.00) 
Terms of trade shock         13.70** 
(4.86) 
Interest rate shock         0.22** 
(0.08) 
Number of observations 332 332 332 329 332 332 332 332 326 
R
2
 (within) 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.71 
F-statistic 42.01***  65.17*** 53.62*** 22.91*** 122.82*** 190.92*** 65.09*** 6916.14*** 
Standard error of regression 1.16 1.25 1.16 1.15 1.13 1.14 1.10 1.13 1.03 
 
a)
Pooled least squares estimates with country-specific fixed effects, except for regression 2 which uses generalized least squares with country-specific random effects. The 
sample consists of 17 industrial countries. The sample period is 1982 to 2003. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. All regressions additionally control for the 
impact of time trend. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters at the country level, are reported in parentheses. ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 
1%(5%/10%) level. 
b)
The Wald χ
2
 statistic is 434.30***. The Hausman test is not applicable since the model fails to meet its asymptotic assumptions. 
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Table 3. Testing for reverse causality
a)
 
 
 Dependent variable: exchange rate volatility 
 Fixed effects regressions Random 
effects 
regression
b)
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unemployment rate -0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
Output gap  0.001 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
Openness  -0.164** 
(0.073) 
-0.132 
(0.118) 
-0.070 
(0.071) 
Total factor productivity 
shock 
  0.106 
(0.633) 
0.139 
(0.564) 
Terms of trade shock   0.026 
(0.185) 
-0.030 
(0.193) 
Interest rate shock   0.000 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Number of observations 332 332 326 326 
R² (within) 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 
F-statistic 0.71 5.33*** 2.64*  
Standard error of 
regression 
 
0.08 
 
0.08 
 
0.08 
 
0.09 
 
a)
Pooled least squares estimates with country-specific fixed effects, except for 
regression 4 which uses generalized least squares with country-specific random 
effects. The sample consists of 17 industrial countries. The sample period is 1982 to 
2003. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. All regressions additionally 
control for the impact of time trend. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters at 
the country level, are reported in parentheses. ***(**/*) denotes statistically 
significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. 
b)
The Wald χ
2
 statistic is 9.05. The Hausman test is not applicable since the model fails 
to meet its asymptotic assumptions. 
 
